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use#LAAINTERPRETING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN INFLATION AND THE
SKEWNESS OF RELATIVE PRICES: A COMMENT ON BRYAN AND
CECCHETTI
Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw*
A
LARGE literature in macroeconomics has examined
how the inﬂation rate is related to the distribution of
relative-price changes. This work has established a striking
fact: there is a strong correlation between inﬂation and the
skewness of this distribution. When inﬂation is high, the
distribution of relative-price changes is typically skewed to
the right; when inﬂation is low, it is skewed to the left. The
oil shocks of the 1970s are one example of this phenomenon:
inﬂation rose while a few goods (oil products) experienced
especially large relative-price increases. But the inﬂation-
skewness correlation is not just a result of oil-shock years.
This fact holds for many time periods and many countries
(e.g., Vining & Elwertowski (1976) and Ball & Mankiw
(1995) for the United States;Amano & Macklem (1997) for
Canada; De Abreu Lourenco and Gruen (1995) for Austra-
lia).
Bryan and Cecchetti (1999) argue that this fact ‘‘need not
be a fact at all,’’because of ‘‘small-sample bias.’’If true, this
is an important claim. It would eliminate an apparently
robust stylized fact that might otherwise hold a clue to
understanding the causes or effects of inﬂation. We are not,
however, convinced by Bryan and Cecchetti’s assertion. Our
goal in this note is to explain why.
On its face, Bryan and Cecchetti’s claim is puzzling.Their
paper presents a model in which there is an underlying true
distribution of price changes, and the observed distribution
is obtained by sampling a subset of these price changes.
They show that the skewness of the sample distribution may
be correlated with the sample mean even if there is no
skewness in the population distribution. This model, how-
ever, does not capture the reality of how price indices are
constructed. It is not the case that there are a large number of
sectors, and the government computes the CPI by sampling a
small number of them. Instead, the government measures
prices in all sectors (of which there may be a small or large
number depending on the level of disaggregation). The
observed correlation of the mean and skewness is based on
the full population of sectors. So ‘‘small-sample bias’’ does
not appear to be possible. Because the data used to construct
price indices are comprehensive, one cannot avoid the
conclusion that the inﬂation-skewness correlation is a fact.1
If the idea of small sample bias is not relevant here, how
should one interpret the numerical simulations presented by
Bryan and Cecchetti? The substance of their argument, we
believe, is that it is easy to explain the correlation between
inﬂation and skewness. Previous authors have worked hard
to explain this fact: Ball and Mankiw (1995) propose that
this correlation can be explained with ‘‘menu cost’’ models
of price adjustment, while Balke and Wynne (1996) argue
that it can be explained by a multisector, real-business-cycle
model. By contrast, Bryan and Cecchetti generate the
inﬂation-skewness correlation in a much simpler model.
Although it would be wrong to interpret their results as
showing that the correlation doesn’t exist, one could plausi-
bly interpret them as showing that this correlation doesn’t
prove anything.As they put it, ‘‘such statistics are not useful
in distinguishing sticky from ﬂexible price-setting behavior
in macroeconomic models.’’
To evaluate this argument, it helps to step back and review
the motivation behind the Ball-Mankiw and Balke-Wynne
theories. The starting point for these authors is the classical
theory of price determination. Central to this theory is the
classical dichotomy: relative prices are determined by real
factors, and the aggregate price level is determined by
monetary factors. Speciﬁcally, if there are N sectors in the
economy, there are N-1 relative prices. Real variables, such
as shifts in demand and costs in the various sectors,
determine these N-1 prices, using any good or combination
of goods as the numeraire. The aggregate price level is
determined by the supply and demand for money; this idea is
summarized by the quantity equation, MV 5 PY. The N-1
relative prices and the price level, which equals the average
of all nominal prices, together determine the N nominal
prices.
In this classical model, there is no obvious reason that the
behavior of the aggregate price level is related to the
distribution of relative prices. If M, V, and Y remain
constant, then P is constant, and any shifts in the distribution
of relative prices do not inﬂuence the price level. To explain
the observed inﬂation-skewness correlation, one must ex-
plain how the economy differs from this classical baseline.
Balke and Wynne offer one story for the inﬂation-
skewness correlation. In their model, certain shocks to the
economy generate both skewness in the relative-price distri-
bution and changes in aggregate output. For instance, when
OPEC raised oil prices, relative prices in energy-related
sectors rose by 50% or more, balanced by smaller relative-
price decreases in the rest of the economy. This generated
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Wynne’s real-business-cycle model, the oil price increase
also reduces aggregate output. The fact that Y falls implies,
by the quantity equation, that P rises if M and V are constant.
One can debate whether this effect is large enough to explain
the observed inﬂationary effects of OPEC shocks. But
qualitatively, Balke and Wynne have a clear story about how
a shock can generate both higher inﬂation and greater
skewness.
Ball and Mankiw take a different approach to explaining
the facts: they depart from the assumption of nominal price
ﬂexibility implicit in the classical model. As in the classical
model, the money supply and the N-1 equilibrium relative
prices determine the desired nominal prices in the N sectors;
holding constant monetary factors, desired changes in
nominal prices average to zero. Because of the costs of price
adjustment, however, prices adjust only at ﬁrms that desire
especially large nominal changes. This implies that large
changes in desired prices have disproportionately large
effects on actual price adjustment. In the case of an oil
shock, the large desired adjustments in energy sectors lead
these ﬁrms to raise their nominal prices. While equilibrium
nominal prices fall in all other sectors, they fall by too little
in each sector to warrant immediate downward adjustments.
Because some nominal prices rise and others do not fall, the
overall price level rises.
Bryan and Cecchetti’s model includes neither nominal
rigidity nor a real-business-cycle relation between relative
prices and aggregate output. Instead, they simply assume
that nominal prices for different sectors are drawn randomly
from a symmetric distribution. Presumably, the realizations
of prices in various sectors reﬂect sectoral shocks. The ﬂaw
in the model is the assumption that, if there are N sectors,
nominal prices are determined by N draws from the distribu-
tion of prices. In this case, if N is small, then one large
realization of a nominal price will both raise the average
price level and generate skewness. But this model differs
from the classical model in assuming that the N independent,
sectoral price shocks feed directly into the aggregate price
level.Again, in classical theory, the price level is determined
by monetary factors, and sectoral shocks determine only the
N-1 relative prices. Bryan and Cecchetti do not explain what
deviation from this classical benchmark might allow sec-
toral shocks to affect the price level. Unlike Balke-Wynne
and Ball-Mankiw, they offer a statistical ‘‘explanation’’ for
the observed inﬂation-skewness correlation without any
obvious economic interpretation.
One can build intuition for these issues by again consider-
ing the OPEC price increases of the 1970s. At the time, it
appeared obvious to many laymen that higher oil prices
meant higher inﬂation, simply because oil prices are an
important component of price indices. By contrast, Milton
Friedman argued in 1975 that this shock was not inﬂation-
ary.According to Friedman, the layman’s view was based on
the ﬂawed idea that sectoral shocks determine nominal
prices, and that the aggregate price level is determined by
the sum of these prices. Friedman pointed out that the OPEC
shock was a rise in a certain relative price, and that,
whenever one relative price rises, there must by deﬁnition be
other relative prices that are falling. Shifts in the N-1 relative
prices are consistent with any level for aggregate P, and so
monetary factors are needed to pin down P. Friedman asks,
‘‘Why should the average level of all prices be affected
signiﬁcantly by changes in the prices of some things relative
to others?’’ and suggests that there is no good answer.
History has shown that Friedman was wrong in practice: the
OPEC shocks did cause inﬂation. But he is right in theory, if
one assumes the basic classical model. Thus, the challenge
for macroeconomists is to ﬁnd the deviations from this
classical benchmark that explain the facts. Instead of doing
this, Bryan and Cecchetti merely offer a statistical version of
the layman’s misconception.
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